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particular mineral must be extracted and sold before the production 
royalty is paid. But, as will be seen in the next section of this 
Brief, there are no legal or practical reasons to support placing 
production royalties in permanent funds. 
D. Potential Practical and Legal Nightmare 
To require mineral production royalties to be deposited 
in permanent funds would be to open a most ominous Pandora's Box. 
And there is no legal necessity for doing so. 
First, as has been shown, the Enabling Act contemplated only 
(1) that designated lands without known mineral value be transfer-
red to the State, (2) that such lands be sold and the proceeds 
of sale deposited in permanent funds, and (3) that only the income 
derived from the permanent funds be used to support the public 
schools. It is nothing short of sheer fantasy to assume that 
Congress had some scheme in mind in 1894 for Utah's use of mineral 
proceeds from minerals which Congress did not intend to grant 
to the State. 
The first word Congress gave to Utah concerning minerals 
was in 1927, and that grant, with accompanying conditions and 
restrictions, was entirely clear~and Utah has at all times 
strictly complied with those conditions and restrictions. And 
there is no requirement that any mineral proceeds be deposited 
in any permanent fund. See Section II of this Brief, supra. 
However, it is possible that Utah received title to some 
minerals by virtue of the Enabling Act and without the aid of 
-19-
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APPENDIX B 
IDENTIFICATION OF FUNDS AND ACCOUNTS IN CONTROVERSY 
OPERATING FUNDS INTO WHICH 
MINERAL PROCEEDS SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN DEPOSITED 
Uniform School Fund for public schools 
Utah State Hospital operating fund 
University of Utah operating fund 
Normal School operating fund 
Miners Hospital operating fund 
State Industrial School operating fund 
School of Mines operating fund 
Utah State University operating fund 
School for the Deaf operating fund 
Reservoirs 
School for the Blind operating fund 
Public Buildings 
-26-
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15 
Compare this with Utah's actual expenditures 
(State and counties) for the support of the common 
public schools for 1979: $402,423,826.00. And that 
figure includes only maintenance and operation-not 
capital expenditures. Thus, the Federal grant for the 
support of Utah's public schools, intended to be equal 
to one-ninth of the total value of the State, now yields 
slightly more than hvo percent of the cost of supporting 
the public schools-and, as indicated, this does not in-
clude expenditures for land, buildings and other im-
provements. Unfortunately, the Federal school land 
grant to Utah for the support of the common schools 
never materialized as intended. So far, the economic 
benefits to Utah from the solemn public h·ust have been 
insignificant. 
How can this be? The discussion which follows 
will show some of the ways in which the Federal Gov-
ernment has failed to, keep its commitments to Utah and 
has unfairly and illegally diminished the original school 
land grant. 
D. Ji'ederal Violations of tlze Bilateral Compact 
1. The 5% Violation 
This Court judicially knows that the finn policy 
of the United States in 1894 (date of Utah's Enabling 
Act) and 1800 (date of Utah's statehood) was to dis-
pose of the unreserved public domain. Indeed, Section 
g of Utah's Enabling Act (28 Stat. 107) provided that 
the Vnited States would dispose of the unreserved 
Federal lands and would pay to Ptah, as an additional 
component of the school land grant, 5% of all proceeds 
A-5 
. 1;' 
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The original Art. X of the Utah Constitution of 1896, 
Sections 5 and 10, provided: 
11 Section 5. The proceeds of the sale of lands re-
served by an Act of Congress, approved February 21st, 1855, 
for the establishment of the University of 'Utah, and of 
all the lands granted by an Act of Congress approved July 
16th 1874, shall constitute permanent funds, to be safely 
invested and held by the State; and the income thereof 
shall be used exclusively for the support and maintenance 
of the different institutions and colleges, respectively, 
in accordance with the requirements and conditions of said 
Acts of Congress. 11 (Emphasis added.) 
* * * 
11Section 10. Institutions for the Deaf and Dumb, and 
for the Blind, are hereby established .... All the pro-
ceeds of the lands granted by the United States, for the 
support of a Deaf and Dumb Asylum, and for an Institution for 
the Blind, shall be a perpetual fund for the maintenance of 
said institutions. It shall be a trust fund, the principal 
of which shall remain inviolate, uaranteed b the State a ainst 
.I 
I 
i 
loss or diversion. 11 Emphasis added. ( 
Originally, the Utah Constitution in Art. X, Section 3 of the Constitution, J 
referred to the "perpetual" or "permanent" school. fund as only the "State . f 
school fund 11 and did follow the express mandates regarding the nondisposi-
tion of the funds set forth in the Enabling Act of 1894. 
On or about 1937, the Utah Legislature amended its Constitution, I 
which· amendment became effective January 1, 1939, and provided, in part: 
11 
••• And the proceeds of the sale or other disposi-
tion of minerals or other property from school and State 
lands, other than those granted for specific purposes ... 
shall constitute a fund to be known as the uniform school 
fund, which uniform school fund shall be maintained and 
-4-
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v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563, 38 S.Ct. 193, 62 L.Ed.473 (1918), wherein 
the United States Supreme Court held that lands known to be valuable 
for coal mineral at the date title would vest, were not intended by_ 
Congress to be included in the grant of school section lands in Utah's 
Enabling Act. The words "lands known to be valuable for mineral" are 
words of art and have a specific meaning, namely, (1) location (2) 
filing claim (3) annual assessment work and that if a claim is staked 
out and assessment work is done, then the land is known to be valuable 
for mineral. There is no question that title to the school section 
lands passed to the State and there is no dispute that those minerals 
which were not 11 known to be valuable for mineral," as those terms are 
used in the mining laws, passed to the State of Utah at statehood (or 
at the official survey date a few years thereafter). In fact, Utah has 
11 presumptive title 11 to mineral royalties under the Enabling Act if not 
known to be mineral at the time of the official government survey (said 
survey being circa 1902). See generally Work v. Braffet, 276 U.S. 560, 
48 S.Ct. 363, 72 L.Ed. 700 (1928). See, also, Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 
U.S. 392, 6 S.Ct. 95, 29 L.Ed. 423 (1888). 
Following the decision of the U. S. Supreme Court in Sweet, 
supra, it appeared as if a great injustice was placed upon the citizens 
of the State of Utah who in good faith made purchases of State school 
section lands. The State would transfer its title in good faith. In 
later years, subsequent development of the surrounding territory would 
-7-
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derived from the sale, lease, or rental of these 
school lands, should be invested to form a principal, 
permanent fund--the interest only of which might be 
used for the benefit of the common and public schools 
or other state institutions as the case may be. Thus, 
it will seem that the principal can never be depleted 
or dissipated. It will be noted that, under this plan, 
it is necessary for a state to accumulate a principal 
fund of some considerable amount in order to realize 
sufficient interest to be of benefit to its common school 
system and to result in the reduction of taxation for 
school purposes. Having this in mind, your committee 
fully realizes the difficulties under which these states 
are forced to labor and, therefore, reach the conclusion 
that their cause was a meritorious one, and that Congress 
could well afford to adopt a beneficent attitude toward 
them in view of the end desire to be accomplished. It 
also prevents valuable mineral lands from falling into 
the hands of third parties, thereby insuring the proper 
return and full measure of support to the particular in-
stitution to which the lands were granted. 
"Some states have already enacted. laws reserving under 
themselves all minerals found in state lands which are 
sold. Those that do not have such provisions upon their 
statute books, of course, must comply with the terms of the 
act in order ·to realize its benefits." (At pages 3 and 
4) 
The above-cited House Committee report,' even though suggest-
ing an amendment to the statute not relevant herein, demonstrates that 
the United States Congress, in adopting the Act of 1927, clearly intended 
that ~he mineral proceeds from State school section lands would be treated 
in exactly the same manner as set forth originally in the respective 
· Enab 1; ng Acts of the various pub 1 i c 1 and States affected thereby. In 
fact, the Act itself, in Chapter 57, subparagraph (b) provides, inter 
alia; 
- 12-
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in usage within the same Enabling Act would compel one to believe 
that Congress intended a different meaning to attach to Section 10 
in discussing 11 proceeds.of lands." 
Section 8 of the Enabling Act also provides inter alia: 
"That the proceeds of the sale of said lands, 
or an ortion thereof, shall constitute permanent 
funds. 11 Emphasis added.) 
which reenforces the conclusion that proceeds include all mineral deriva-
tive revenue. 
Utah Code Ann., Section 68-3-1, provides: 
"Words and phrases are to be construed according . 
to the context and approved usage of the language .... 11 
11 Where there is doubt respecting true meaning of certain words, then 
words should be read in light of conditions and necessities which they 
are intended to meet and objects sought to be attained thereby." United 
States Smelting Refining & Milling Co. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 58 Utah 
168, 197 P. 902. 
Appellant (Appellant's Brief, pages is:19) argues the diminution 
of land value is required and a sorted analogy is offered (page 18) that 
rentals from school lands are similar to interest earned from the permanent 
fund. The analogy fails when considered further. Do the rentals remain in 
the fund to generate compounded interest? No. Is the benefit to school 
children thereby compounded if the rentals are spent annually? No. There 
is no permanent benefit to school children. The permanent school fund 
-19-
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Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court stated: 
"Herein, there are involved conditions affixed by 
Congress in the Enabling Act which pertain to proprietary 
rights of the United States and the placing of restric-
tions upon the disposition of the property of the United · 
States being placed in trust with the State as distinct from 
conditions qualifying political rights of the new State. 
We do not perceive a limitation or restriction -0n the State 
in the exercise of its sovereign powers in the advancement 
of education or schools in the terms of an Enabling Act. 
We see therein only regulations touching the care and dis-
position of properties granted in trust to the State by the 
federal government. 
"It has been held by the highest authority that con-
gressional regulations in an Enabling Act remain in force 
after admission of the State into the union, if the subject 
is one within the regulating power of Congress. United States 
v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 34 S.Ct. 1, 58 L.Ed. 107. 11 (At 
page 659) 
The Court found that said regulations by the United States Con-
gress in the Enabling Act exist as valid laws of the United States, and 
under -the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. VI, 
Section 2, said laws may not be modified or changed by an act of the Okla-
homa Legislature or the people of Oklahoma in amending their Constitution. 
The Court in the above Oklahoma v. Commissioners, supra, dis-
tinguished the case of Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 31 S.Ct. 688, 55 L.Ed. 
853, (1911), which struck down a provision of the Oklahoma Enabling Act, 
requiring the City of Guthrie to be maintained as the capital city of the 
nevi State of Oklahoma until 1913, as an invasion by Congress into the 
-21-
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elected to interpret Colorado's constitution in such a way as to 
find the ordinance unconstitutional under the state constitution. 
The entire substance of appellant's case here rests on its suppli-
cation that this honorable court abandon the clear weight of 
legal authority throughout the United States and base its decision 
on one lone jurisdiction. This court has never held itself bound 
by the decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court; it was, however, 
shown such deference to decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court interpreting constitutional provisions similar to Utah's 
constitution. 
POINT II. THE SUBJECT ORDINANCE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
A. SIMILAR PROVISIONS IN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH SHOULD BE SIMILARLY 
INTERPRETED. 
Appellants claim that the county ordinance, in addition to 
violating the federal constitution, violates the Constitution of 
the State of Utah. Appellants allege in their complaint that the 
ordinance in question violates Article VI (Legislative Department) 
and Article I, Section 7 (due process) of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah (see paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the Complaint at page 
3 of the record). Without amending their complaint the appellants 
now raise, in this appeal, the argument that the ordinance also 
violates the Article IV, Section I, and Article I, Sections 2, 18 
and 24 of the state constitution. 
The due process clause of the Federal Constitution (5th and 
14th Amendments) and the due process clause of our state consti-
-7-
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of evidence to the contrary, it can be assumed that the demand 
for massages will remain relatively constant after the ordinance 
becomes effective. The entrepreneur operating a massage parlor 
will adapt to this governmental regulation and hire masseurs and 
masseuses in a ratio corresponding to his clientele. Massage 
parlors that have been relying on the sale of sexual favors will 
suffer financial losses and their business will be suppressed, 
but the commerce of selling massages will continue with regulation 
and without suppression or prohibition. 
The restrictions imposed by the ordinance are regulatory in 
nature and not prohibitory. See WORDS AND PHRASES, "Regulate", 
Vol. 36A, page 315. The court in Patterson v. City of Dallas, 
rejected the plaintiff's allegation that the opposite sex massage 
ordinance went beyond regulation and stated: 
It does not prohibit, but permits, a masseur to admin-
ister a massage to a member of the male sex, and a 
masseuse to administer a massage to a member of the 
female sex. The right to conduct a massage establish-
ment, after complying with the Massage Ordinances and 
securing a permit, is not prohibited but is merely 
regulated. [At page 841] 
The court in Ex parte Maki, adopted the same view: 
Since the ordinance in question does not prohibit 
either man or woman from engaging in the occupation of 
the masseur but merely regulates the conduct of a 
business in the interest of the state, there is no 
infraction of article XX of the Constitution. [At page 
67] 
In summary, the ordinance before the court will regulate 
massage parlors and will suppress the sale of sex acts in massage 
parlors. 
-23-
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The leading case in the State of Utah in the area of pre-
emption is Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 93 P.2d 671 (1938), wherein 
Justice Wolfe set down the rule that a local municipal ordinance 
is not in conflict with a similar state criminal statute unless 
(1) the local ordinance permits activities prohibited by the 
state law, or (2} the local ordinance is inconsistent with the 
state law. The court stated at page 673: 
The city does not attempt to authorize by this ordinance 
what the Legislature has forbidden; nor does it forbid 
what the Legislature has expressly licensed, authorized, 
or required. 
* * * 
Unless legislative provisions are contradictory in the 
sense that they cannot coexist, they are not to be 
deemed inconsistent because of the mere lack of unifor-
mity and detail. 
Thirty years later, the Supreme Court of Utah, in the case 
of Salt Lake City v. Allred, 437 P.2d 434 (1968), had before it 
an argument similar to the one that is now urged upon the court 
by the appellants and set forth in Lancaster. Salt Lake City had 
adopted an ordinance prohibiting aiding or abetting the directing 
of any person to any place for purposes of committing and act of 
sexual intercourse for hire and the court upheld the ordinance 
and stated at page 437: 
In summary we conclude that the state has not preempted 
the field of sexual offenses since the ordinance in 
question is a proper exercise of police power, and the 
ordinance is not inconsistent with the state statutes 
pertaining to sexual offenses. 
Thus, the rule in Utah is directly contrary to the rule in 
California set forth in Lancaster. As to whether or not the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Annotated, Section 17-5-77, 1953 as amended, supra, under which 
Salt Lake County enacted the subject ordinance. 
The court in Allred further stated that the language containec 
in the enabling statute was sufficient to sustain the ordinance 
directed at prostitution and stated at page 435: 
Also in accordance with the power contained in Section 
10-8-84, U.C.A. 1953, the Utah Supreme Court, in Ogden 
City v. Leo, 54 Utah 556, 182 P. 530, 5 A.L.R. 960, 
upheld as reasonable and valid a city ordinance prohibit-
ing the maintenance of booths of certain dimensions in 
restaurants so as to prevent persons of both sexes 
having no regard for law or morals meeting in such 
places. If the prohibition involved in the Leo case 
had a reasonable relationship to the preservation of 
the public morals, the prohibition of an act of sexual 
intercourse for hire under the city ordinance in this 
case would also appear to bear a reasonable relationship 
to the preservation and protection of public morals. 
The protection of public morals has always been a 
matter of .local concern which requires regulation by 
municipalities, and properly falls within the scope of 
the police power. 
The supre~e court in State • v. Salt Lake City, 21 U.2d 318, 
445 P.2d 691 (1968), had before it a comprehensive ordinance that 
purported to license nonprofit clubs. The plaintiffs sued Salt 
Lake City alleging that the area of licensing private clubs was 
preempted by the State. The court determined that the area was 
preempted by the State and the City's ordinance was struck down, 
but in doing so, the court made an important distinction between 
municipal ordinances that impose additional requirements above 
and beyond those required by the State legislature and those 
municipal ordinances that prohibit citizens from doing some act, 
such as is the case with the ordinance in question. The court 
stated at page 694: 
-30-
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determined that the health, safety, and welfare of the community 
required a regulation requiring massage parlor licensees and 
masseurs to be at least 21 years of age. Section 15-18-3(1) of 
the ordinance requires all licensees to be at least 21 years of 
age. 
This court ruled that age was not a constitutionally suspect 
classification in Purdie v. University of Utah, supra, and that 
classifications based on age need only be rational related to a 
legitimate state interest. This court held at page 833: 
Plaintiff has also urged us to declare that age is an 
inherently suspect classification and that post-graduate 
education at a university is a fundamental right, 
requiring application of the strict scrutiny test. We 
decline to do so, as the authorities cited are unper-
suasive, but base our reasons and opinion on the rational 
relationship test, noted ante. 
At the public hearing, Captain Morgan testified that massage 
parlors are often fronts for the sale of illicit sexual activities 
and that it was common to see teenage girls who worked in the 
massage parlors arrested for such crimes (record, pp. 35C and 
35D). It is apparent that the purpose of the ordinance, including 
this section, was to suppress the incidence of illicit and immoral 
sexual activities in massage parlors in the unincorporated area 
of Salt Lake County. Such a purpose constitutes a legitimate 
state interest for the purpose of equal protection analysis. By 
reasoning that young massagists would be susceptible to sexual 
exploitation because of their lack of maturity, and that there is 
some relationship between age and the maturity, the Board acted 
in a reasonable manner to further a legitimate state purpose . 
... 43_ 
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